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 Over the last two years, Ebola and Zika have made international headlines and 
been the focus of a storm of legislation, media attention and public concern in the United 
States. As each disease threatened the United States mainland, President Barack Obama 
and his Administration were forced to contend with the challenges of logistics, funding, 
public safety and the prevention of panic. This thesis explores messaging from the 
Obama White House during the Ebola and Zika crises in an effort to analyze how each 
disease was handled individually and how their handlings compare. Two major questions 
of this thesis are whether the Obama White House learned lessons from the Ebola 
experience that were applied to the Zika response and whether public and media 
criticisms of White House response lead to any alterations in actions or messaging. This 
analysis reveals that while it is unclear whether there was marked improvement in 
messaging between Ebola and Zika, there were distinct differences in how the 
administration responded to Zika. An important finding of this thesis is an overall lack of 
academic examination of the United States government’s handling of these two public 
health crises from a communication studies perspective.  This gap in literature and 
research makes this analysis relevant especially to communication practitioners and 
academics, and also to leaders across the interconnected fields of politics, policy and 
public health. This thesis suggests that the bridge necessary as multiple disciplines 
prepare for future epidemics is communication. 
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Human history is wrought with and in many ways shaped by the interaction of 
disease and society. In his book Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, 
Diamond (2005) states that:  
The history of interactions among disparate peoples is what shaped the 
modern world through conquest, epidemics, and genocide. Those 
collisions created reverberations that have still not died down after many 
centuries, and that are actively continuing in some of the world’s most 
troubled areas today (p. 16).  
Though disease has existed throughout human history, the domestication of livestock 
brought with it plagues that had previously not threatened human beings (Diamond, 2005, 
pp. 195-197). Over the centuries, the world has seen many devastating epidemics and 
pandemics: smallpox, bubonic plague, yellow fever, malaria, typhoid, cholera, dengue, 
many strains of influenza, AIDS, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and 
tuberculosis (CNN, 2014). Though many hope for a day when we will collectively 
outsmart or outpace disease, the fact remains that we continually face infectious disease 
threats, both new and familiar.  
Since the spring of 2014, Ebola Virus Disease has claimed the lives of over 
11,000 people—primarily in West Africa—and the number of probable cases worldwide 
is over 28,000 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016). These numbers do not 
include a handful of cases where individuals traveled to or returned to the United States 
and were treated in U.S. hospitals, or two cases of hospital transmission in Texas. While 
the risk of Ebola is troubling, it is not the only disease that has recently threatened 
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populations across the globe. In 2016, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
reported at least 22,000 cases of Zika in U.S. Territories, and more than 4,500 cases 
within the continental United States and Hawaii.   
Ebola and Zika have much in common. Both diseases have existed for decades, 
but only recently has each disease’s infection rate reached epidemic proportions, 
affecting tens of thousands on a global stage. Recent spikes in infection have caused both 
diseases to become noteworthy due to their potential to cause catastrophic loss of life and 
significantly impact on quality of life. In addition to these risks to individuals, both 
diseases pose significant threats to humanity. As part of a global effort to combat these 
diseases, the American government has utilized public and inter-agency reporting and 
action communication. Those communications placed President Barack Obama in a 
difficult position where he needed to simultaneously quell public anxieties and convince 
federal agencies to respond. To fully understand the risk of infection for each disease and 
the government’s reactions to these risks, it is first important to understand the basic 
details pertaining to Ebola and Zika.  
Though Zika rarely results in death or severe illness in those infected (it most 
typically causes mild fever and flu-like symptoms, diarrhea and rash), among its most 
troubling effects is the risk of severe birth defects and other problems during pregnancy 
for women who contract the disease (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014c). 
Several global health agencies—including the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC)—confirmed in 2016 that Zika causes microcephaly and severe 
microcephaly in infants born to mothers who were infected during or even before 
pregnancy. The CDC (2014a, para. 1) defines microcephaly as, “a condition where a 
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baby’s head is much smaller than expected” that can “occur with no other major birth 
defects, or it can occur in combination with other major birth defects.” Severe 
microcephaly is a more extreme version of microcephaly, and results in babies with heads 
much smaller than expected and a failure of the brain to develop correctly at all (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014a). These defects present lifelong challenges 
and health issues, and often result in a greatly shortened lifespan (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2014a). By December 14, 2016, U.S. researchers estimated that 
roughly six percent of pregnant United States women infected with Zika “had fetuses or 
babies with birth defects” (Hirschler, 2016).  
Ebola is the stuff of nightmares—the disease has become a convenient plot point 
in entertainment meant to show the public the apocalyptic horror possible if an exotic 
hemorrhagic fever shows up at home. In their review of the depiction of infectious 
diseases in cinema, Pappas, Seitaridis, Akritidis and Tsianos (2003) highlight the 
“possible effect that they have on the public’s perception of infection—a perception that, 
when misguided, could prove to be problematic in times of epidemics” (p. 939). Though 
the actuality of Ebola’s effects on the human body are truly horrific, there is enough 
misunderstanding about them to cause confusion among the general public. According to 
the CDC (2014b, para. 1), the term “viral hemorrhagic fever” actually describes:  
A severe multisystem syndrome (multisystem in that multiple organ 
systems in the body are affected). Characteristically, the overall vascular 
system is damaged, and the body’s ability to regulate itself is impaired. 
These symptoms are often accompanied by hemorrhage (bleeding); 
however, the bleeding is itself rarely life-threatening. While some types of 
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hemorrhagic fever viruses can cause relatively mild illnesses, many of 
these viruses can cause severe, life-threatening disease.  
As Pappas et al. (2003) found, presentation of hemorrhagic fevers—often clearly 
dramatized for entertainment purposes—have had dramatic effects on public 
understanding of and response to potential outbreaks. For example, though Alan Lenhoff 
(2014) determined that public health officials communicated efficiently during the height 
of the 2014 Ebola epidemic, he observed a significant overreaction from media, 
policymakers and the public. Moreover, the study showed that a majority of Americans 
felt only somewhat confident in the U.S. government’s ability to respond to an outbreak 
in its own backyard (Lenhoff, 2014).  
Public uncertainty pertaining to disease spread can result in dangerous and 
unproductive responses, exacerbating the risks associated with Ebola and Zika. As part of 
the effort to quell these damaging responses, it is the job of the President of the United 
States to ensure a response that communicates risk assessment and a rational but 
sufficient action plan in response to these threats. Despite the importance of this type of 
response, there has been little focus on communication between government leadership—
including the President and heads of state—and the public. Instead, attention from other 
fields of study has centered on broad interaction between political entities—such as the 
effect of partisan politics on the decision-making process of Congress to allocate funds 
for Ebola or Zika. For example, in their work in the areas of law and health, both Dolgin 
(2016) and Ottersen et al. (2016) found significant political obstacles to the overall 
responses to Ebola and Zika, but did not examine messaging directly. As part of the 
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President’s effort to protect American citizens, these communication strategies must be 
continually adapted and updated as events unfold. 
The importance of this adaptability is captured by Dr. Stephen Redd, director of 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Office of Health Preparedness and 
Response, who stated in a reflection on the Ebola and Zika threats: “The lesson of the last 
10 years is that there’s always something else” (Graitcer, 2016, para. 1). The ever-
evolving nature of the threat posed by disease means that the President’s job requires not 
only vigilance and awareness of events that may previously have existed in a 
geographical vacuum, but also an ability to react both swiftly and calmly in an effort to 
encourage the public to do the same. In order to provide both the best lens through which 
to examine communication to date and a firm foundation for recommendations moving 
forward, it is vital to review existing literature in the space where politics and disease 
intersect.   
Literature Review  
 The risk to public health resulting from Ebola and Zika cannot be overstated. A 
great number of researchers have evidenced the need for continued study of diseases and 
how they are relayed to the public. Prior to offering an in-depth analysis of United States 
head-of-state communication in response to the Ebola and Zika crises, the thesis must 
first examine existing research in the areas of bio-geopolitics, media framing, the 
importance of language and strategies in leadership health communication. The literature 
review begins by examining the intersections of biology (in this case, infectious disease), 




A growing challenge for governments responding to health threats is that 
geography no longer prevents or delays the spread of disease. The speed of disease 
spread and transmission has been expedited through ever-increasing speed and frequency 
of air travel and global trade, resulting in potential for diseases to spread faster than 
systems are prepared to handle them. Budd, Bell and Brown’s (2009) review of the 
development of sanitations procedures and regulation in the air travel and shipping 
industry highlights the importance of recognizing an “increasingly fluid, mobile and 
inter-connected society” and the impact of that interconnectedness on how health threats 
must be handled (p. 426). The authors cite the examples of SARS (Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome) in 2003 and H1N1 (an Influenza A virus subtype commonly 
known as Swine Flu) in 2009 as evidence that the global airline network correlates with a 
massive increase in risk when it comes to the spread of infectious disease (2009, p. 427). 
The authors’ findings make it clear that while continued advances in technology offer 
new ways to combat disease, they also create new ways and increased speeds through 
which infectious disease threatens the world.  
In response to the threat of diseases rapidly spreading across the globe, a new 
discipline emerged: bio-geopolitics. Van Efferink (2015) puts forth a working definition 
of “geopolitics” as the concept of how “power (influence, politics) and space (territory, 
soil)” interact. Applying the idea of geopolitics to infectious disease offers significant 
implications: heads of state must negotiate the politics of how they choose to handle 
health threats, including maintaining media relationships and open lines of 
communication with the communities they serve. As several authors reveal, this 
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negotiation is fraught with hurdles for political leaders and communication practitioners 
alike. Greer and Mätzke (2012) analyze issues and complexities in communicable disease 
control and stated that the topic of disease spread and the communication necessary for 
prevention and treatment is “one of the oldest and most important functions of the 
modern state” yet the topic “receives very little attention today” (p. 887). The authors’ 
research on European societies draw conclusions that are applicable for health and 
political communication practitioners worldwide through the identification of a common 
problem which has not resolved over time: failings in the “coordination between 
professions, governments and organizations” (Greer and Mätzke, 2012, p. 889). 
Successful coordination between these actors demands consistent, clear communication 
from political leaders—the very thing that appears very difficult to deliver no matter the 
location of the health threat at hand, or the decade.   
Bashford’s Medicine at the Border (2006) addresses how the world responds to 
threats from disease in a global era when geographical boundaries no longer necessarily 
offer protections or challenges. The author (2006) explains an aim to develop “what 
might be called a world history of the geopolitics of disease prevention” (p. 1). Written 
before Ebola threatened the United States in 2014 and long before Zika appeared as threat 
to the U.S. mainland or even the Americas, Medicine at the Border begins by laying out 
the editor’s and author’s take on “the age of universal contagion” (Bashford, 2006, pp. 1-
17). Bashford (2006) states that “the history of world health cannot be understood as 
anything but merged formations of colonial, national and ‘world’ politics, played out on 
specific local ground” (p. 4). This clearly defined relationship between politics and health 
is precisely the base upon which the research questions explored later aim to suggest that 
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leaders must understand and engage with the realities of global health in a way that 
communicates information and need for action to private citizens. Increasingly, this 
complex interplay of politics and health also plays out in the media. The following 
section explores this interplay and lays out details of media framing that are critical to 
this thesis project.  
Framing and the Media  
 Technological innovations resulting in increased human travel have also meant 
easier spread of infectious disease across the globe. Simultaneously, innovations in 
communications technologies such as the internet and mass media have dramatically 
shortened the time necessary for news of infection to disseminate. It no longer takes days 
or weeks for news to travel across the globe. As a result, the public often knows about 
health events before political leaders and health officials have had an opportunity to 
respond or evaluate the crisis. Because media outlets often preempt official government 
statements, the way news organizations and other new media frame disease threat is of 
utmost importance.  
In their narrative analysis of how Australian media portrayed avian influenza and 
how the government there responded to the news of its spread, Abeysinghe and White 
(2011) found that “both government and media discourses could be understood in terms 
of risk, contagion and blame” (p. 311). The authors also identify infectious disease 
outbreaks as “necessarily social events,” and suggest that a “prominent aspect of both the 
media and government narratives is the concept of preventing contagion” (2011, p. 311). 
The idea of responding to infectious disease threats as a social function is an interesting 
one, as political leaders must often navigate the social intricacies of those they serve.  
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In an analysis of print media related to Ebola and border control in 2014 and 
2015, Abeysinghe (2016) found that the “perception of contagion has led to policy and 
social actions around border control... (and) remains a persistent frame through which 
infectious disease is understood and managed” (p. 452). In a strong statement as to the 
power of media framing, the author also points out that the media discourse in the case of 
Ebola in 2014 “served to reconstruct Ebola as a problem for the West, ignoring and 
silencing the core context in West Africa, or representing ‘Africa’ in general terms (2016, 
p. 454). These findings mean that leaders in the West must attempt to address this 
reconstruction in their communication with publics while still ensuring that the citizens 
they serve feel that they are putting local interests first.  
 While it is important for leaders to assure their constituents that they are 
responding to a threat with their unique interests as a priority, it is not always easy to 
balance the appropriate amount of response nor the coverage of that response. Nerlich 
and Koteyko explored swine flu in 2009 in UK newspaper articles and blogs (2011, p. 
710). The authors found differences in how previous emerging disease outbreaks had 
been reported and that “news reports about this new type of flue were often mixed with 
meta-reporting focused on speculations about the dangers of ‘under’ or ‘over’ reporting 
as well as on the possibility that the outbreak may have been hyped up and by whom” 
(2011, p. 711). These findings are of particular interest when considering heads of state’s 
communication because they suggest that the way a health threat is framed by the media 
includes framing that is specific to how publics may respond to government 
communication. As public response is considered, it is clear that word choice and 
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language are of great importance. The next section of this literature review explores the 
influence of language in infectious disease communication and media.  
The Importance of Language  
 Media framing affects public understanding and response as well as the way that 
political leaders may respond. Negative or urgent framing by the media may mean both a 
public panic and an immediate response from government whether leaders are prepared 
to respond at the time or not. At the core of this framing is the impact of wording and 
message construction. The choice between words such as “outbreak,” “epidemic,” and 
“emergency” may mean the difference in public panic or calm processing and response.  
 In an examination of the impact of the word “outbreak,” O’Neil and Naumova 
(2007) suggest that the “notion of ‘outbreak’ evolves as our knowledge about diseases, 
exposure and manifestation deepens,” (p. 443). The authors go on to review both the 
socio-political and the scientific interpretations and functions of the word “outbreak” 
(2007, p. 445). O’Neil and Naumova (2007, p. 445-446) make the important point that:  
“Outbreak” can be used in a primarily political way, with the worst case 
scenario being the intent to manipulate public opinion: Unwarranted alarm 
can be instilled, resulting in some scientifically unsupportable political 
outcome; that is, a policy relating to an intervention that does not reflect 
the disease pattern or the need for protecting the public health.”  
The prospect of political outcome—and in particular those outcomes which may not be 
well-supported by the scientific or health communities—clarifies the importance of 
language in health crisis communication. The choice to use one word or another 
(outbreak versus epidemic, for example) or to assign a title of urgent or not carries 
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implications beyond politics. The way the public interprets a government’s perception of 
threat stands to impact the way individual citizens respond. For heads of state, the 
implications of political outcomes increase exponentially, making language choice in 
response to threats from infectious disease are complex.  
 The seriousness conveyed in language used to describe a public health threat is 
not the only concern for communication practitioners. In a content analysis of television 
news about pH1N1, Fogarty et al. (2011) found that “the virus was rarely referred to by 
the name pH1N1 during the coverage and instead, was routinely termed swine ‘flu” (p. 
3). This common-sounding name for the virus made information about its spread and the 
risk to the public easily understood. This increased access to knowledge regarding the 
disease has been argued as one reason for the eventual, successful containment of swine 
flu (Fogarty et al., 2011, p. 3).  The authors examined messages which addressed the 
seriousness of the disease, advice and recommended actions, and reassurance that the 
government was responding adequately (2011, pp. 3-5).  
 The idea that words must be chosen carefully is not new for political leaders and 
heads of state, nor for health communication practitioners. What the literature reviewed 
in this section has shown, however, is that choosing between “outbreak,” “epidemic,” 
“event,” or some other option may mean the difference between panic and processing on 
the part of the public. As the next section reveals, leaders must master the many layers of 
health, risk, and political communication and prove their ability to prioritize critical 





Strategies in Leadership and Crisis Communication  
 Despite sizable data regarding the transmission of diseases in our contemporary, 
globalized world there is a surprising lack of academic research into how heads of state 
and other political leaders respond from a communication perspective to health threats. 
There has not, however, been a shortage of media representatives to step forward and ask 
questions of political leaders and systems as epidemic events have unfolded. In the wake 
of Ebola surfacing in Texas in 2014, for example, there was extensive media coverage on 
how Governor Rick Perry responded. At the time of this research, however, there appears 
to be no significant literature existing in the academic community that addresses the 
questions posed by his actions or the resulting media attention. This dearth of information 
has implications beyond academia. Community leaders, government officials and health 
leaders are unable to learn from case studies which lack detail. While it may be obvious 
that there were missteps in Governor Perry’s handling of the Ebola crisis, a lack of 
analysis of actions and consequences means that it is difficult to learn from these failings 
in order to provide better responses during future crises.  
Not only must political communication practitioners and political leaders respond 
to health threats and face scrutiny from the public and the media on the adequacy of their 
action or inaction, they must also contend with implications that may have an impact on 
the larger political climate—particularly in the United States. In an article for The Week 
that focused on the state and federal government’s response to the Ebola outbreak’s 
surfacing in Texas, Weber (2014, para. 9) asks, “Where, then, is the blame for Perry?”—
going on to note that while at the time of the article, Perry was “now facing some 
criticism,” it was “barely a murmur compared with the roar of election-season blame 
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being heaved on Obama and Frieden.” Weber goes on to compare political leaders’ 
communication in response to other disasters and major threats, including Hurricane 
Katrina (2014). Recently, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated nature’s potential for 
catastrophic impact on society. Earlier in this literature review, the idea of outbreaks as 
social events was examined. This social concept may prove similar to that seen in disaster 
response in that often, the public may be reluctant to engage with messages of prevention 
but hyper aware and reactive to messages about imminent threat already occurring.  
Given the often frantic response of the public to infectious disease spread, it is 
imperative that leaders work during times of quiet to develop trusting relationships with 
their constituents. Abraham (2009) analyzed approaches from scholars to risk and 
outbreak communication, showing that these responses are “rarely a pure, clean process 
of winning public trust and transmitting information objectively and openly” but “more 
often than not a messy business requiring political decisions with winners and losers (p. 
604). In an examination of political insights gained following the Ebola experience in 
2014, Greer and Singer (2017) identify significant implications of the interplay of 
epidemic response and the politics (p. 81). The authors point out that “much of the 
response to public health events such as Ebola is a mixture of suasion and executive 
action,” defining suasion as “a way to overcome fragmented governance arrangements by 
using non-hierarchical means” (2016, p. 6). A highlight of this research is a glimpse into 
the responses at both the state and federal levels. In this case study, the authors focus 
primarily on logistics action as opposed to communication leaving a gap in answering the 
question of how individual leaders’ communication about the logistics of state and 
federal response may have been informed or interpreted. While this study will not address 
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the question of interpretation, the idea of trust in political leadership communication is 
one that surfaces frequently in the public health field.  
However important it may be, a public’s trust of its leaders is not enough to quell 
public panic. Leaders must work with advisors and experts in clinical and public health 
fields to determine what they will ask of the public and how much information needs to 
be disseminated. Bergstresser (2015) suggests that there is a “basic lack of trust in 
information that is disseminated through official sources,” and that this “has troubling 
implications for the future of public health in the United States and beyond” (p. 57). On 
the topic of Ebola, Bergstresser suggests that for many, “reacting to Ebola with fear can 
be considered thoroughly rational” (2015, p. 58). Interestingly, the author places some 
blame on access to care and the idea in the United States in particular of “individual 
responsibility” (2015, p. 58). Based on this assessment, a significant challenge for 
political leaders lies in first deciding which actions or behaviors will best protect the 
public and then determining how to effectively ask for these changes  
The section of this literature review devoted to bio-geopolitics showed evidence 
that disease is just an important a matter for heads of state as economy or security. 
Gregory’s (2005) analysis of the communication dimensions of foot and mouth disease in 
the United Kingdom in 2001 suggests that public communication is divided into two 
categories: active interest and passive interest (p. 321). Though this case occurred in the 
UK, Gregory’s analysis provides valuable insights for political leaders as to the impact of 
health events on society. Gregory calls the outbreak “the most severe civil crisis that had 
been seen in the UK since the Second World War” (2005, p. 312). The very suggestion 
that the crisis was on par with one of the greatest conflicts in human history makes the 
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fear of infectious diseases felt by publics and leadership alike quite real. A takeaway 
from this particular aspect of the literature is that it behooves political leaders to take 
threat posed by infectious disease just as seriously as that posed by conflict. 
Conclusion  
This review of literature has examined existing research and perspectives on the 
interplay of infectious disease and politics, of the media and public reaction during health 
crises, and of the weight of word choice in health communication. In its final section, 
there was a look at work examining past examples of political leadership and strategic 
communication where health matters are concerned, though it has been pointed out that 
academic investigation into head of state health communication is lacking. It is unclear 
whether the Ebola epidemic has quieted for the foreseeable future, or when it may 
resurface—perhaps this time finding its way onto a transcontinental flight and into U.S. 
hospitals much sooner. In a similar vein, Zika continues to spread and present healthcare 
providers and policymakers with complex challenges when it comes to addressing its 
morbidity and stopping its advance. As the United States transitions to its next President, 
an understanding of the strategies deployed and lessons learned from President Barack 
Obama on these fronts becomes paramount. This thesis project seeks findings that will be 
useful for communication practitioners advising or working with heads of state and 
government agencies, health systems, public health agencies and media covering threats 
posed by disease domestically and internationally. 
Methodology 
A common understanding of quantitative versus qualitative research may be 
numbers and hard data versus interpretive soft data about things other than just numbers. 
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This distinction is over-simplified, of course. While quantitative analysis utilizes 
constructs for trustworthiness such as validity and reliability, qualitative analysis must be 
scrutinized according to a separate framework that reviews credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability (Anney, 2014, p. 272).  
This thesis is an online qualitative content analysis of communication messages 
from the White House of President Barack Obama regarding the Ebola and Zika virus 
epidemics between 2014 and 2016. Qualitative content analysis was an ideal method for 
this research because it allows the researcher and reader to explore themes occurring in 
the communication messages. This methodology also uncovers questions relevant to 
future research as to the interpretation and success or failure of those messages.  
Research Design 
The research questions stated in the section below will be analyzed through a 
online qualitative content analysis of communication from President Barack Obama and 
his White House staff in response to both the Ebola and Zika epidemics. Elo and Kyngäs 
(2008) identify a key purpose of qualitative content analysis according to Krippendorff as 
“providing knowledge, new insights, a representation of facts and a practical guide to 
action” (p. 108). In their analysis of qualitative content analysis in health research, Hsieh 
and Shannon (2005) show that the methodology “offers researchers a flexible, pragmatic 
method for developing and extending knowledge of the human experience” (p. 1286). 
Through these priority purposes of providing insights and guiding action through a 
flexible lens, the qualitative content analysis process is an ideal method for examining 
messages and drawing conclusions about lessons learned and strategies applied by the 
White House in the cases of the Ebola and Zika threats.  
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 Hsieh and Shannon (2005) describe the summative approach to qualitative content 
analysis as starting “with identifying and quantifying certain words or content in text with 
the purpose of understanding the contextual use of the words of content,” and go on to 
state that “this quantification is an attempt not to infer meaning but, rather, to explore 
usage” (p. 1283). This thesis explores usage of messaging platforms and identifies themes 
that occur in content across those distinct forms that contribute to an understanding of 
how two crises unfolded and were handled by the Obama White House through a 
summative approach to qualitative content analysis. Appendices A through D show 
content forms and possible message interpretations as they relate to the themes identified 
during this research. 
Research Questions  
RQ1: How has President Barack Obama framed the Ebola virus threat domestically and 
internationally? 
RQ2: How has President Barack Obama framed the Zika virus threat domestically and 
internationally? 
RQ3: How has messaging from President Barack Obama regarding Zika compared to that 
on Ebola?   
RQ3(a): How did the amount and types of messaging from President Barack 
Obama and the White House regarding Zika compare to those on Ebola?  
RQ3(b): How has messaging from President Barack Obama been distributed 
between informative and actionable regarding Zika and Ebola? 
RQ4: Did President Barack Obama alter his message regarding Zika in response to 
criticism received on his Ebola communication? 
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Units of Analysis  
The research questions in this thesis focus on the content, timing, and quantity of 
messages from the White House of President Barack Obama in response to both Ebola 
and Zika. Messaging selected included website content, video messages, and press 
releases. Because some of the research questions compare aspects of the responses to 
Ebola and Zika, an effort was made to select artifacts that were similarly titled or themed. 
Due to the differences in how the Administration responded to the two diseases, there 
were some unavoidable discrepancies in type and quantity of artifacts available for each 
disease.  
 All direct White House communication samples were obtained via a search on 
first the White House website, and later, the archived website of the Obama White House 
(the archived website was used where pages or artifacts were no longer hosted live on 
whitehouse.gov).  Media artifacts including op-eds, general reporting, interviews, etc. 
were obtained via a combination of Google searches including the words “Obama,” 
“White House,” “Ebola” and “Zika” and through Johns Hopkins’ library search engine 
resources Academic Search Complete and Communication & Mass Media Complete.  
Analysis of Artifacts  
 In order to include analysis of White House messages and media responses and 
criticisms of the Obama Administration during the Ebola and Zika crises, I reviewed 
these two different types of artifacts in distinct ways. To analyze White House artifacts, I 
began by reading through the titles on all returned search results from the White House 
and archived White House pages. Results were categorized into four subsets: video, 
image, press release and speech. Once categorized, I reviewed the video, press release 
 19 
and speech category artifacts in full three times. Each time, I noted whether the particular 
artifact provided context to the crisis at hand (in this case: Ebola, Zika or both), 
contributed to constructing a timeline of events, or provided messaging examples that 
directly corresponded to one or more of my research questions. I used this review process 
as well as quotes and examples from the artifacts to construct a written response to each 
research question in the Results section. To analyze media artifacts—namely media 
coverage of the Obama Administration’s handling of Ebola and Zika—I began with a 
long list of search results titles. I focused mainly on articles that compared the two 
diseases, as this was where I looked for criticisms of the Obama Administration and 
commentary on how Zika was handled in a post-Ebola climate.  
Coding Categories 
 From the websites reviewed, I specifically examined messaging from four 
sources: homepages, videos, press releases and speech transcripts.  
• Homepages included the dedicated pages focused on Ebola and Zika housed on 
whitehouse.gov. These pages included frequently asked questions, links to outside 
resources, instructions and some images and infographics.  
• Videos were housed either directly on the whitehouse.gov (or archived) site(s) or 
on YouTube. I analyzed audio of voiceovers, including audio from individual 
speakers such as the President of the United States and the Director of the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention.  
• Press releases were housed on the whitehouse.gov site. Messaging from press 
releases was analyzed based on language and tone in reference to Ebola and/or 
Zika.  
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• Speech transcripts were housed on the whitehouse.gov site. Text from speech 
transcripts included that from speeches dedicated to only Ebola, Zika or both, as 
well as that from larger speeches covering a variety of topics that addressed one 
or both of the viruses within the body of the speech.  
Across these four categories, artifacts were coded for recurring themes in how Ebola, 
Zika or both were addressed. This system is shown in tables organized by research 
question and themes identified in the Appendices of this document.  
Verification of Process 
  In an analysis of why masters students opted to use quantitative trustworthiness 
criteria on findings from qualitative research, Anney (2014) found that many students 
incorrectly applied quantitative criteria to qualitative findings (p. 272). Anney’s (2014) 
recommendations focus on stronger teaching of qualitative trustworthiness criteria and 
applications (p. 272). Shenton (2004) points out that though “many critics are reluctant to 
accept the trustworthiness of qualitative research, frameworks for ensuring rigour in this 
form of work have been in existence for many years” (p. 63). Shenton goes on to explain 
Guba’s constructs as a framework for verification in qualitative research.  
Credibility  
 Anney (2014) uses a definition of credibility in qualitative research as “the 
confidence that can be placed in the truth of the research findings” (p. 276). Shenton 
(2004) provides several provisions that contribute to credibility in qualitative research 
(pp. 64-69). Of Shenton’s suggested possible provisions, this research employed frequent 
debriefing sessions with an advisor, reflective commentary, thick description of the 
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phenomenon under scrutiny and a thorough examination of previous research findings to 
address credibility.  
Transferability  
 According to Anney (2014), transferability in qualitative research “refers to the 
degree to which the results of qualitative research can be transferred to other contexts 
with other respondents—it is the interpretive equivalent of generalizability” (p. 277). 
Anney (2014) suggests thick description and theoretical/purposive sampling to address 
transferability (p. 278). The research conducted during this thesis project employs both of 
these tactics to ensure transferability. In particular, purposive sampling is utilized in the 
selection of artifacts across multiple content forms for analysis, based on quantity, quality 
and timing.  
Dependability  
 It is imperative that valuable research is repeatable, and this need is addressed 
through thorough attention to dependability. Shenton (2004) explains that in of 
dependability in qualitative research is to show that “the processes within the study 
should be reported in detail, thereby enabling a future researcher to repeat the work, if not 
necessarily gain the same results” (p. 71). In order to meet dependability standards, this 
thesis covers in detail research design and implementation, data gathering and artifact 
selection and also a reflection of limitations and challenges.  
Confirmability  
 Shenton (2004) defines confirmability as “the qualitative investigator’s 
comparable concern to objectivity” (p. 72). Anney (2014) goes on to explain 
confirmability as “establishing that data and interpretations of the findings are not 
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figments of the inquirer’s imagination, but are clearly derived from the data” (p. 279). 
This thesis project provides an audit trail through extensive description of the method and 
analysis and an abbreviated visual of reflexive journaling through the tables in the 
Appendices, thereby ensuring confirmability.  
Into the Results 
 The process of compiling artifacts in the form of homepages, videos, press 
releases and speech transcripts and analyzing those artifacts through the identification of 
themes and the exploration of four major research questions yielded many clear 
takeaways and many important questions.  The following Results section organizes 
findings by theme, speaking to quality of message content, and cites details from the 
artifacts themselves to support interpretive findings as well as clear representations of 
differences in content forms and quantity of messages found in response to the Ebola and 
Zika crises.  
Results 
RQ1: How has President Barack Obama framed the Ebola virus threat domestically 
and internationally? 
 This research question examines messaging from the Obama White House on the 
Ebola virus epidemic. An examination of artifacts spanning the time from the Ebola 
epidemic escalation in West Africa to its presence in the United States revealed two 
distinct themes. First, the Obama White House focused on a portrayal of President 
Obama and his Administration as a calm in the storm both through its overall messaging 
content (including web content, press releases and videos) and in messages delivered by 
President Obama directly. Secondly, the Administration was deliberate in crafting and 
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disseminating messaging that positioned and then reinforced the United States as a global 
leader in public health.  
On September 16, 2014, President Barack Obama called the work of the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention and other agencies, “an example of what happens 
when America leads in confronting some major global challenges” (The Obama White 
House, 2014b, para. 3). This statement reflects the sentiment put forth by the White 
House and the President that the United States is capable of leading successful efforts to 
combat global health threats. This statement also officially labeled Ebola a “major global 
challenge” in the eyes of the President—putting to rest any remaining public uncertainty 
over whether or not the growing outbreak far from U.S. shores was indeed a serious 
health event warranting American attention.  
While the White House’s focus on Ebola was initially to provide general 
information to the public, its communication rapidly shifted toward panic reduction and 
prevention. Not long after the White House’s classifying of Ebola as a “major global 
challenge,” on the night of September 25, 2014, Thomas Eric Duncan sought medical 
care for flu-like symptoms at a Dallas hospital (Voorhees, 2014). By October 8, Thomas 
Eric Duncan had died (Voorhees, 2014)—the first confirmed Ebola case and resulting 
death on U.S. soil. The Duncan case marked a turning point in the demands of the 
American public on the White House. Ebola was not just a threat to U.S. citizens at home 
and living abroad, it was now a threat knocking on Americans’ doors.  
Prior to Duncan’s visit to a Dallas hospital, on September 16, 2014, President 
Barack Obama stated that, “First and foremost, I want the American people to know that 
our experts, here at the CDC and across our government, agree that the chances of an 
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Ebola outbreak here in the United States are extremely low” (The Obama White House, 
2014, para. 4). A confirmed case of Ebola on United States soil following this statement, 
however, seriously undermined President Obama’s efforts to reassure the public. Thomas 
Eric Duncan proved not only that Ebola did pose a threat to Americans at home, but also 
that despite the messaging deployed by the White House and Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention—it appeared that American hospitals and healthcare teams may not be 
fully prepared to handle the disease. During the course of Duncan’s care at Texas Health 
Presbyterian Hospital, two nurses were infected with Ebola: Nina Pham and Amber 
Vinson (CBS/AP, 2014). These infections problematized the reassurance logic in White 
House messaging: infection control measures shared with healthcare systems by the CDC 
and other organizations either were not enough or were not adequately deployed and 
there was the potential for Ebola to spread more easily to members of the community due 
to the nurses’ interactions with coworkers, friends and family before their diagnoses.  
Even after the death of Thomas Eric Duncan and the infection (and recovery) of 
Nina Pham and Amber Vinson—two nurses who cared for him—President Obama chose 
to reinforce America’s role as a leader in the global response to Ebola and assure the 
public that health leaders still saw the risk of an outbreak in the United States as very 
slim. On October 28, 2014, President Obama addressed the nation from the South Lawn 
of the White House, explaining his approach to the Ebola threat: “And it's typical of what 
America does best -- when others are in trouble, when disease or disaster strikes, 
Americans help. And no other nation is doing as much to make sure that we contain and 
ultimately eliminate this outbreak than America” (The Obama White House, 2014a, para. 
3). This statement aimed to solidify the idea of the United States as a hero on the global 
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health stage—and in fact on an overall global stage. The words “Americans help” seemed 
aimed at not only making the American people feel better about the state of things, but 
also about the idea of Americans traveling to those areas hardest hit by Ebola and 
working to combat the disease there—the health equivalent of the American public’s 
blessing for boots on the ground in any conflict.  
Throughout the timeline of Ebola emerging and evolving as a crisis for the U.S. 
homeland, two themes emerged in White House communication on the disease. First, the 
Obama White House framed the Ebola epidemic as increasingly urgent while reinforcing 
the importance of a calm and resolute public. Second, President Barack Obama’s 
messaging focused on the United States’ role both within its borders and internationally 
as a leader in fighting the disease as well as in public health advances overall. The 
following sections explore each of these themes, isolating the trajectory of each message 
and its role in the White House’s communication strategy during the Ebola crisis. 
A portrayal of calm in the storm. When communicating with the public through 
press releases, social media messages, video, and briefings, the White House refrained 
from focusing heavily on details about Ebola (how the virus spread, symptoms, etc.) and 
instead highlighted successes in the collective efforts of the Obama Administration and 
other agencies to combat the disease. From one of his very first addresses on the 
outbreak—on September 16, 2014—President Barack Obama shared a wealth of 
information with the American public about the events in West Africa, an American 
physician who was recovering from the disease and what Washington was doing to 
address it and keep Americans safe:  
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Now, this is a daunting task. But here’s what gives us hope. The world 
knows how to fight this disease. It’s not a mystery. We know the science. 
We know how to prevent it from spreading. We know how to care for 
those who contract it. We know that if we take the proper steps, we can 
save lives. But we have to act fast. We can’t dawdle on this one. We have 
to move with force and make sure that we are catching this as best we can, 
given that it has already broken out in ways that we had not seen before 
(The Obama White House, 2014b, para. 11). 
These words acknowledge grave danger posed by Ebola—its morbidity, its 
unprecedented spread in the outbreak which began in 2014 in West Africa and the threat 
it created in places without modern health systems in place. The President’s words also 
show his calm resolve in overseeing the United States’ response to Ebola. The arrival of 
physician Kent Brantly (an American who had been working to treat Ebola patients in 
West Africa) and Nancy Writebol (an American missionary who became infected while 
working with her organization in Liberia) in Atlanta to be treated on U.S. soil “prompted 
a jittery response on social media, highlighting the special terror that the virus has come 
to carry for Americans familiar with movies such as Outbreak  and the best-selling 
Richard Preston book The Hot Zone” (Achenbach, Dennis & Hogan, 2014).  In response, 
the President did not minimize the threat posed to the American people and the world. 
Instead, he humanized the devastation abroad: “Hospitals, clinics and the few treatment 
centers that do exist have been completely overwhelmed. An already very weak public 
health system is near collapse in these countries. Patients are being turned away, and 
people are literally dying in the streets” (The Obama White House, 2014b, para. 7). 
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President Obama also reinforced Dr. Brantly’s recovery after his safe and successful 
treatment at Emory University Hospital: “I had a chance to see Dr. Brantly in the Oval 
Office this morning…He looks strong and we are incredibly grateful to him and his 
family for the service that he has rendered to people who are a lot less lucky than all of 
us” (The Obama White House, 2014b, para. 6). Not only did President Obama offer 
verbal assurances to the American people, but he noted safe personal interaction with a 
recovering Ebola patient.  
 The White House’s approach to promoting calm in the midst of a panic also 
applied to messaging aimed at continued and increased funding and support for 
preparation and vaccine research. Messaging focused on the potential for success in 
vaccine development and offered a positive distraction to the public and to the media. On 
December 2, 2014, President Obama spoke from the National Institutes of Health in 
Bethesda, Maryland in an update on the survival of provider infections in a U.S. hospital 
as well as the hard work to develop a vaccine:  
So our strategy is beginning to show results. We’re seeing some progress. 
But the fight is not even close to being over. As long as this disease 
continues to rage in West Africa, we could continue to see isolated cases 
here in America… So we cannot let down our guard, even for a minute. 
And we can’t just fight this epidemic; we have to extinguish it (The 
Obama White House, 2014c, para. 16).  
Again, during this speech, President Obama doubled down on his calming tone despite an 
escalation in events within the United States, including the infection of two health 
workers who treated Thomas Eric Duncan in Texas, the continued surge of the virus in 
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West Africa and a slew of infection scares. The President went on to state that “Much of 
the progress we’ve made—and the progress we still need to make—depends on funding 
that’s running out… This is an expensive enterprise” (The Obama White House, 2014c, 
para. 17). This calm, steadfast call to action was part of a White House strategy to brand 
the United States as a global leader in public health throughout the Ebola crisis as well as 
communicate a responsibility of the nation to lead the way in research.  
The U.S. as a global leader in public health. President Barack Obama 
responded quickly to the Ebola crisis, offering his thoughts long before the disease 
reached the United States. His messages were intended to bolster efforts to care for the 
sick abroad and to spearhead scientific work to fight the disease. On February 11, 2015, 
the Office of the Press Secretary released a statement and fact sheet on progress in 
nation’s response to Ebola:  
Today, approximately 10 months since the first U.S. personnel deployed 
to West Africa to fight Ebola, we mark important milestones in our 
response to the epidemic and chart the way ahead. In keeping with the 
President’s charge that we tackle Ebola as a national security priority, we 
built, coordinated and led an international response—involving thousands 
of personnel, both U.S. and international, civilian, and military–to fight 
the disease at its source. All the while, we enhanced our preparedness to 
encounter Ebola on our shores, establishing comprehensive measures to 
screen and detect the disease in travelers, while strengthening our capacity 
to diagnose, isolate and treat any patients safely (The Obama White 
House, 2015a, para. 1).  
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This statement to the American public thoroughly explained the response to date as well 
as the United States’ goals for the future regarding Ebola. The statement also indicates, 
“This response showcased American leadership at its finest on the world stage, just as we 
came together as a nation to fortify our domestic resilience in the face of understandable 
apprehension” (The Obama White House, 2015a, para. 1). This message is not only one 
of accomplishment, but also one of purpose. The White House was careful to position the 
United States as the leader of the fight against Ebola with a greater sense of responsibility 
than simply protecting its own shores and citizens. This messaging reinforced the idea of 
America as a global leader in public health for the good of humanity.  
 Asking Americans for patience, support and vigilance were a foundation of 
establishing the nation as one which faced the Ebola challenge head-on. On the same day 
as the press release mentioned above, President Obama addressed the nation on 
America’s leadership in the fight against Ebola:  
I said that fighting this disease had to be more than a national security 
priority, but an example of American leadership. After all, whenever and 
wherever a disaster or a disease strikes, the world looks to us to lead. And 
because of extraordinary people like the ones standing behind me, and 
many who are in the audience, we have risen to the challenge (The Obama 
White House, 2015b, para. 2). 
Through this messaging, the President carried the theme of the United States as a hero in 
the Ebola response. He also brought back a familiar tactic: the use of humanization and 
relatability. President Obama never made the providers or researchers battling Ebola 
seem mythical or far away. Instead, he thanked them profusely and publicly and created a 
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sense that the American people were not part of the group effort to combat Ebola. 
President Obama also made an effort to connect the general public to the medical 
professionals working to prevent an outbreak.  
RQ2: How has President Barack Obama framed the Zika virus threat domestically 
and internationally? 
 RQ2 examines the messages of the Obama White House in response to Zika in 
much the same way as RQ1 reviewed those on Ebola. It is important to note at the outset 
of this question response, however, that the chronology of Zika’s spread and threat to the 
United States mainland was much less linear than that of Ebola. If the Ebola epidemic 
may be looked at as an avalanche, Zika may be seen as a steady rising tide—a threat, 
certainly, but as much because of its ambiguity as the effects of the disease itself. As a 
result of this difference, two distinct themes emerged in the artifacts. First, it is apparent 
that the Administration used a lack of clarity about Zika to generate great motivation 
among members of the public to respond via prevention and research—though the results 
show that it is unclear whether this translated to government decision-making. Second, 
the old adage that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” surfaced as a 
prominent theme in communication from the Obama White House on Zika.  
 Though the Zika virus was discovered in 1947, it was mid-fall 2015 before Brazil 
reported a possible link between microcephaly in newborns and the disease, and February 
2016 by the time the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the virus an 
international public health emergency (Hirschler, 2016). By that time—when the White 
House began a response in earnest—states of emergency had already been declared in 
several central and south American locations and in Puerto Rico (Schumaker & 
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Almendraia, 2016). As part of his response effort, President Barack Obama was included 
in a Washington briefing between health and national security team leaders on January 
26, 2016 on the topic of Zika and the expected threat it may pose to the United States 
(Schnirring, 2016). Following this briefing, the White House response was swift and 
direct: “the need to speed up research efforts to deliver diagnostic tests, vaccines, and 
drugs, as well as the importance of making sure Americans have the information they 
need to protect themselves from the virus” (Schnirring, 2016). As this quote reveals, the 
very first official White House response to the Zika virus was not simply informative, but 
instead focused on active response.  
 By the time President Obama had begun to request action and funding directed to 
the Zika virus threat from Congress, American citizens still knew very little about the 
disease. In an effort to update citizens at home on the steps America was taking to protect 
them from Zika and to inform them of the details of the disease, the White House 
published a Zika home page titled The Zika Virus: What You Need to Know (Pope, 2016). 
This web page provided several links to the CDC’s Zika homepage containing easily 
digestible material for citizens, a fact sheet that outlined the President’s Zika action plan, 
and updates on requests for funding from Congress to combat the disease.  
 Zika proved a complex and rapidly-accelerating problem for the United States. 
Beginning as a handful of isolated health events, American health officials suspected 
these infections might be tied to a mosquito-borne illness far from U.S. shores. This new 
disease quickly spread across the U.S. territories and to the beachfront states of the 
southeastern United States with a clear track record of tragic and dramatic consequences. 
Two themes surface as the White House communication response to Zika is examined. 
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First, the Obama administration admitted uncertainty as the Zika crisis developed. This 
uncertainty was used to garner support for funding and research to better understand and 
combat the disease. Second, White House messaging aimed directly at the American 
people (as opposed to journalists, the global community or those in health and 
government professions) was focused on prevention and actions that the public could take 
to protect themselves, their families and their communities. 
Lack of clarity led to great motivation. The very uncertainty of Zika’s true 
potential to cause harm, the questions around its morbidity and in particular the physical 
effects on newborns meant that in the view of the public—some action was always better 
than no action. On February 8, 2016, President Barack Obama included the Zika virus in 
a conversation with “CBS This Morning”:  
The Good news is this is not like Ebola, people don’t die of Zika—a lot of 
people get it and don’t even know they have it… What we now know 
though is that there appears to be some significant risk for pregnant 
women or women who are thinking about getting pregnant. And so we are 
going to be putting up a legislative proposal to Congress to resource both 
the research on vaccines and diagnostics but also helping in terms of 
public health systems… But there shouldn’t be panic on this. This is not 
something where people are going to die from it. It is something we have 
to take seriously (CBS News, 2016).  
During this conversation, President Obama was careful to reassure the American public 
that neither he nor his administration expected Zika to be a profound public health 
tragedy but that it warranted close attention nonetheless. The lack of public panic 
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following this statement indicates that the President’s admittance of uncertainty was a 
successful strategy with the public though it proved only marginally successful within 
government (the President secured an initial and ongoing financial commitment dedicated 
to the disease by redirecting funds utilized to combat Ebola) (Schumaker & Almendraia, 
2016).  
 On May 20, 2016, as fears were heightened in advance of the 2016 Summer 
Olympics in Brazil and as more and more areas reported local transmission and 
confirmed cases, both President Barack Obama and a convincing pair made up of Tom 
Frieden (Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) and Anthony Fauci 
(Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases) addressed the 
public on the Zika situation. Both of these addresses were made with the use of video. 
Both videos focused on a balance in messaging both on what was known about Zika at 
the time as well as what questions still remained.   
During a video briefing, President Obama emphasized that Zika was primarily 
transmitted to humans from a particular type of mosquito and that it was clearly possible 
for Zika to cause serious defects in infants—confirming microcephaly’s link to the virus 
and the possibility of further neurological deficits (The Obama White House, 2016b). The 
President noted that all cases to date in the United States appeared to be travel related, 
adding that there was a growing crisis in Puerto Rico in particular (The Obama White 
House, 2016b). Throughout the video, the President reemphasized uncertainty while also 
sharing the many ways experts were combating the disease—including a focus on 
prevention and mosquito control.  
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A second video on May 20, 2016 from Tom Frieden and Anthony Fauci 
reinforced the information shared during the White House briefing on Zika. Frieden made 
the point early in the video that “This is the first time in history we’ve had a situation 
where a single mosquito bite could result in an infection that creates a terrible fetal 
malformation that changes your life and the life of your family” (The Obama White 
House, 2016c). Frieden’s message once again drives home that the very uncertainty 
which remained at that point in time about the spread of Zika and its potential to wreak 
havoc on the lives of Americans and families beyond American shores was the reason 
why the United States needed to dedicate funding to research and the implementation of 
prevention planning. Though a focus on uncertainty may seem to be a complicated 
messaging goal, a focus on prevention proved to be a concrete and attainable one.  
An ounce of actual prevention really may be worth a pound of cure. 
Ultimately, between a lack of clinical clarity and failure of many common pesticides to 
kill or repel the Aedes Aegypti mosquito that spreads Zika, prevention proved to be the 
best course of action for citizens of the United States. The desirability of prevention-
based measures was conveyed through a homepage created by the White House for the 
public to find information about Zika, how it spreads, and how to limit risk. The website 
focused almost entirely on explaining that the disease was not new—it was discovered 
nearly a generation ago—and that it could be contained. The page (Pope, 2016) answers a 
series of questions the public may have about Zika, including:  
● What is the Zika virus?  
● How is the President working with local leaders to combat Zika?  
● How is Zika transmitted?  
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● Where are people contracting Zika?  
● Who is at risk of being infected?  
● Why are their specific recommendations for pregnant women?  
● What can I do to prevent a Zika infection? 
● Should we be concerned about Zika in the United States?  
● What is the President doing to help combat and control the spread of the Zika 
virus?   
Within the response to nearly every question/section, the White House homepage not 
only answered the question at hand but also provided some sort of suggested action. For 
example, in response to the question, “What can I do to prevent a Zika infection?” the 
page reminds visitors that there is still no vaccine to prevent Zika, then offers suggestions 
on how to prevent mosquito bites (Pope, 2016). In response to this question and several 
others, the page also provides a link to an external resource for further information and 
guidance. An example of these narrative statements and supporting links is: “You can get 
a more-in-depth explanation of prevention measures from the CDC here” with a link to a 
CDC page that details prevention (Pope, 2016). Though the webpage was a thorough and 
direct method of communication with the public about prevention, President Barack 
Obama needed to address the matter himself.  
As the disease continued to progress, the President echoed the message of 
prevention in his updates to the public. In an August 27, 2016 address, President Obama 
condemned the lack of urgent action and funding allocations on the part of Congress in 
response to Zika while also explaining the intricacies and importance of prevention for 
citizens:  
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Still, there’s a lot more everybody can and should do.  And that begins 
with some basic facts. Zika spreads mainly through the bite of a certain 
mosquito. Most infected people don’t show any symptoms. But the disease 
can cause brain defects and other serious problems when pregnant women 
become infected. Even if you’re not pregnant, you can play a role in 
protecting future generations. Because Zika can be spread through 
unprotected sex, it’s not just women who need to be careful—men do too. 
That includes using condoms properly. If you live in or travel to an area 
where Zika has been found, protect yourself against the mosquitos that 
carry this disease… (The Obama White House, 2016d).  
The President continued, detailing additional actions the public may take to protect 
themselves, their families and their communities—as well as protection for the U.S. 
mainland when they return home from travel by continued use of insect repellant so that 
they do not infect mosquitoes within U.S. shores (The Obama White House, 2016d). The 
President’s final request in the video is for all Americans to “make your voices heard”—
another clear action with the potential for true impact in the fight to keep Zika from 
becoming a major public health issue on the United States mainland (The Obama White 
House, 2016d).  
RQ3: How has messaging from President Barack Obama and the White House 
regarding Zika compared to that on Ebola? 
Ebola presented the Obama White House with a large scale, frightening public 
health challenge. The scale of the outbreak in West Africa, the rapid rate at which 
information about the outbreak traveled to the public, and the confirmed transmission of 
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the virus on U.S. soil meant that a robust and rapid response was required of the White 
House and President Barack Obama. The transmission and mortality rates of Ebola 
resulted in fear and concern throughout America, a symptom that was reinforced by 
media coverage and non-stop updates on the virus’ spread across Africa. A population on 
the verge of panic meant that there was a need to understand three things: the outbreak 
abroad, the risk to the American public, and how much information was required to 
communicate effectively about the crisis.  
By the time Zika made American headlines two years later, the Obama White 
House faced a challenge similar to Ebola, but the new disease also carried additional 
burdens. The Zika threat required the administration to determine risk for American 
citizens and then choose a communication strategy that adequately explained that risk. 
Additionally, the Obama White House needed to secure support from a variety of 
audiences (the public, the government, and the health and science communities), and help 
people reduce their chances of infection as the virus spread. As the following analysis 
shows, the challenges presented by Zika were incredibly complex precisely because the 
Ebola outbreak had preceded the virus. Because of this precedence, it is imperative to 
examine the quantity and types of messaging utilized in addressing each disease, as well 
as the goals of those messages.  
  RQ3(a): How did the amount and forms of messaging from President Barack 
Obama and the White House regarding Zika compare to those on Ebola? As this 
thesis noted in the Method section and again at the start of the Results section, the 
chronology of Zika’s progression was much different from that of Ebola. This 
difference—and perhaps the overall experience the Administration had dealing with 
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Ebola, as RQ3(b) and the Discussion explore—meant that messaging quantity and 
content varied by the time Zika was a prominent threat. An examination of the artifacts 
focused on these differences revealed two themes. First, while the sheer quantity of 
messages in response to Zika from the White House was greatly reduced from that on 
Ebola, there was a not a significant difference in quality. Secondly, the Obama White 
House utilized video messaging more heavily in response to Zika than to Ebola at the 
expense of the quantity and diversity of messaging during the height of the Ebola crisis.    
The Ebola crisis intensified rapidly. In order to maintain calm and seek resolution, 
the White House reacted quickly and thoroughly. Zika’s increased presence in the 
headlines and slow creep towards the U.S. mainland, combined with the fact that the 
public has found it generally less terrifying than Ebola, meant that the virus did not 
appear to command the initial full-force response of Ebola. This lackluster response was 
addressed in February 2016 when Annas, Galea and Thea wrote that, “The problem is 
that Zika is not Ebola, or anything like Ebola, and declaring Zika an emergency will 
simply stoke fear, and even panic, in a public that deserves to have public health 
decisions made on the basis of facts and science, rather than on politics and fear.” Media 
criticism of the White House’s response to Ebola began as the threat posed by Zika grew 
with increasing infection rates and geographic spread.  
The 2016 Summer Olympics were held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil—a Zika hotbed. 
It is difficult to imagine a situation where an infectious disease is more difficult to 
contain than one where tens of thousands of people (including over eleven thousand elite 
athletes from around the world) were to be packed into one city which had already 
experienced over 26,000 cases of Zika in 2016 (Settimi, 2016). The Olympics added a 
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need for health officials and governments to act urgently. The games also increased 
media criticism of the handling of the disease’s spread. As the virus simultaneously 
threatened the millions of people involved in the Olympic events and crept toward the 
U.S. mainland, the Obama White House tailored its communication response 
accordingly. In this climate of heightened international pressure, the Obama White House 
needed to avoid mistakes wherever possible where Zika was concerned. It was at this 
time that the importance of experience gained through the Ebola events became most 
apparent, and the University of Michigan (2016) arrived at the conclusion that the events 
which occurred on U.S. soil as a result of the Ebola epidemic showed “overconfidence in 
the health care system’s ability.” The University (2016) also criticized the White House’s 
appointment of an Ebola czar—Ron Klain—suggesting that there be, “some permanent 
coordinator. We shouldn’t have a czar per disease.” The writers went on to cite Greer and 
Singer’s (2017) advice not to “make a political football” of Zika (University of Michigan, 
2016). This advice proved difficult to follow for an administration on the brink of a 
national election.  
As the 2016 Presidential election cycle progressed, the opportunity arose for 
candidates and political parties to take a stand on both the Obama White House’s 
handling of public health crises and the way they (the candidates) may handle such events 
in the future. Research from the University of Michigan (2016) identified two major 
implications of the politicization of Zika: first, that it increased the opportunity for 
candidates to discuss immigration and terrorism and second, that biased media coverage 
likely contributed to both public reaction to Zika itself and to increased overall coverage 
of the disease. 
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These complexities and criticisms meant that developing and maintaining a Zika 
messaging strategy was more convoluted than in the case of Ebola. While some strategies 
remained the same—a White-House-run homepage, for example, dedicated to each 
disease and including resources for more information as well as updates on the United 
States’ role in addressing the threats—there were key differences between the two 
responses overall.  
 Less is not necessarily more. A thorough examination of speeches, statements, 
and other forms of communication that were generated and disseminated by the Obama 
White House reveals that there was far less communication on Zika than on Ebola. A 
search on the Obama White House archived press page revealed twenty full pages of 
results on Ebola containing at least ninety-nine entries specific to Ebola, but only four on 
Zika—with twenty-two of those results focusing on Zika specifically 
(https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov, 2016). Moreover, many of the returned results 
from the search page on Zika are links to exit statements and speeches where the 
President addressed a larger audience and did not speak exclusively about the Zika virus. 
This is a stark contrast to not only the sheer number of results related to Ebola, but also 
the fact that many of those results were either dedicated speeches or briefings which 
addressed Ebola specifically.  
 Strengths and weaknesses of video use emerged. In both the Ebola and Zika 
crises, examination of video messages, website messages, speeches and briefings 
revealed continuity of messaging across platforms—meaning that videos reinforced print 
and verbal messages.   
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From the period where Ebola infection and death rates were rapidly increasing 
across West Africa to the moment health agencies declared cautious victory on the 
horizon with no new transmissions—the White House used video messages to update the 
American public regarding the disease. These messages included information on Ebola 
delivered during general video addresses, weekly addresses from the President and 
special messages. The videos used as part of the White House’s communication on Ebola 
existed parallel to a landslide of speeches, briefings and other communication across 
social media, the internet, and traditional media channels.  
Through combining video and other forms of messaging on Ebola, the Obama 
White House reinforced its messages—particularly those focused on action. On 
November 3, 2014, the White House shared a video titled Voices of Courage: Fighting 
Ebola at its Source. This video stands out as an example of a multi-platform message and 
as a message that both reinforces other means of communication while also serving an 
independent purpose: to provide calm and clarity to the American people. In the video, 
President Barack Obama (2014) states:   
We’ve got hundreds of Americans from across the country. Nurses, 
doctors, public health workers, soldiers, engineers, mechanics…who are 
putting themselves on the front lines of this fight. And when they come 
home, they deserve to be treated properly. They deserve to be treated like 
the heroes that they are (The Obama White House, 2014c).  
One aspect of the Ebola crisis that was important for the Obama Administration to 
address was potential panic. It was, therefore, imperative that the President work to 
explain the importance of Americans answering the call to respond to Ebola abroad and 
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also to explain the measures in place to protect American citizens upon their return from 
West Africa. The November 3, 2014 YouTube video accomplishes all of this while 
reinforcing Holst’s (2014) message on the Obama White House webpage entitled “Here’s 
How You Can Help With the Effort to Stop the Spread of Ebola.” 
In contrast to coverage of Ebola, the White House’s coverage of Zika and its 
threat to the United States primarily relied on video communication. These videos aimed 
at educating and empowering Americans as Zika became a public health priority: two 
videos from May 20, 2016 (one from President Barack Obama’s briefing and one that 
was a conversational video featuring Tom Frieden and Anthony Fauci) and one video 
from August 26, 2016 (a weekly address video from the President focused solely on 
Zika). Along with a dedicated Zika homepage, these videos comprised the bulk of the 
Obama White House’s messaging. Each video focused on eye contact with the viewer, 
clear speech and the offering of action items centered on protection and prevention.  
An August 27, 2016 Weekly Address YouTube video published by the Obama 
White House titled Taking Action Against the Zika Virus was comprised of nearly five 
full minutes of President Barack Obama addressing the American people directly solely 
on the topic of Zika and what they—as individuals and as a collective—need to do to 
protect themselves (The Obama White House, 2016d). In comparison to the Voices of 
Courage: Fighting Ebola at its Source video, Taking Action Against the Zika Virus 
featured President Obama front and center, without music or interview cuts with other 
individuals, and is an example of how differently the Administration approached video 
messaging in the age of Zika as opposed to during the Ebola crisis. President Obama 
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began the video message with a story about a mother expecting her third child, and went 
on to note that he understood her fears as a father himself:  
She was, in her words, extremely concerned about the Zika virus and what 
it might mean for other pregnant women like her. I understand that 
concern. As a father, Ashley’s letter has stuck with me, and it’s why we’ve 
been so focused on the threat of the Zika virus. So today, I just want to 
take a few minutes to let you know what we’ve been doing in response, 
and to talk about what more we can all do (The Obama White House, 
2016d).   
President Obama made Ashley relatable and conveyed his own personal connection to 
her concerns. When he went on to say that he was letting the public know what was 
happening in response to Zika, his choice of words spoke directly to Ashley and also to 
all Americans. While this humanization message and call to action was strong, the 
President also used the video to call out members of Congress for not acting aggressively 
to respond to the Zika threat:  
Republicans in Congress did not share Ashley’s extreme concern, nor that 
of other Americans expecting children. They said no. Instead, we were 
forced to use resources we need to keep fighting Ebola, cancer and other 
diseases. That’s not a sustainable solution. Congress has been on a seven 
week recess without doing anything to protect Americans from the Zika 
virus (The Obama White House, 2016d). 
After explaining that his Administration had done all it could despite the hurdles 
presented by Congress, President Obama outlined simple actions the public could take to 
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protect themselves. It is clear in this example, however, that Greer and Singer’s (2017) 
concerns over making a “political football” out of Zika were not unfounded. 
RQ3(b): How has messaging from President Barack Obama been distributed 
between informative and actionable regarding Ebola and Zika? This thesis found two 
primary themes in Obama White House communication as this question of informative 
versus actionable messaging was explored. First, in the case of both diseases the 
Administration opted to share as much information as possible with the public. This focus 
on information distribution was a hallmark of the Administration’s management of public 
health issues. Second, in the absence of detailed information or specific answers 
requested by the media or the public, the Obama White House used action messaging as 
an appeasement. In this way, the Administration gave the public something to focus on 
that they were capable of doing as opposed to fueling panic over helplessness or lack of 
understanding.  
At first glance, many of the messages from the White House regarding Ebola 
appear informative and reassuring, while many of those regarding Zika seem focused on 
preventative or supportive action. What was not immediately apparent during the course 
of this research was if discrepancy was due to the fundamental differences between the 
two viruses and the threats they posed or due to an evolution in messaging strategy. This 
idea of strategy evolution is further explored in RQ4.    
Where public health is concerned, there is no such thing as too much 
information. Because of Ebola’s reputation as highly infectious, highly fatal, and 
gruesome, White House communication teams prioritized clarifying the nature, 
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symptoms, and transmission of Ebola. In addition, these teams offered information 
regarding the threat posed to the world, the nation, and individual American citizens.  
Responding to Zika was challenging in a way that Ebola was not due to the 
questions that remained as to its clinical characteristics and varying methods of infection 
(mosquito transmittal, sexual transmission, etc.). Though the amount of information the 
Obama White House had to share on each of these diseases differed, their treatment was 
the same: lay out answers to frequently asked questions early and update those answers as 
new information is available, share what the administration knew and when they knew it 
and provide access to shared resources should Americans want more information or want 
to do more to protect themselves or others. The Obama White House was thorough in its 
response to both Ebola and Zika from an information-sharing perspective.  
 Action as distraction. Ebola was not an enigma—scientists and health 
professionals understood how it spread and the details of its morbidity decades before it 
became a national priority in the United States during the massive outbreak of 2014-
2015. Still, the best medicine for the disease was prevention. The largest challenge posed 
from a communication perspective during the outbreak at hand was that it was no longer 
as straightforward for the average American citizen to simply avoid contact with Ebola in 
its reservoirs in Africa or in an infected patient—Americans now needed to understand 
how to protect themselves during travel, in public places and even in trusted health care 
settings within the United States. Nearly one year into the timeline of the Zika crisis, 
there was still relatively little known about its health risks and connection to devastating 
effects seen in infants born to Zika-infected mothers (such as microcephaly). In the face 
of this frustrating lack of additional or more thorough information to share with the 
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public, the White House focused its energy on working with other agencies—such as the 
CDC—to develop and share preventative measures any citizen may implement.  
One way the White House sought to foster creative resolution of the Ebola scare 
was through innovative messaging. Among the White House’s Ebola communication that 
focused on safety and prevention was a page developed by Lindsay Holst (2014) titled, 
“Here’s How You Can Help With the Effort to Stop the Spread of Ebola.” Holst’s (2014) 
page promoted the American public pitching in through a variety of possible actions to do 
their part in the fight against Ebola: “There's something each of us can do right now to 
help stop the global spread of Ebola -- whether by volunteering, sharing a good idea, or 
making a monetary or other contribution.” The page included suggestions for how 
“regular Americans” may get involved included signing up to be a medical volunteer, 
sharing an idea for how to help combat the global spread of Ebola and learning about 
other ways to contribute—including monetary gifts to organizations on the front lines 
(Holst, 2014). Holst’s use of the descriptor “regular Americans” is its own message in 
this communication: the Obama White House was reaching out not just to the educated, 
skilled, or elite—but truly attempted to create a collective solution. Each option on the 
page included additional links where visitors to the site may find more detailed 
information on a particular path to involvement.  This type of communication not only 
provided suggestions as to how an individual American citizen may protect themselves, 
but also gave the public an opportunity to feel they were united in a battle against a 
common enemy alongside their President and the many people and organizations 
working to respond to the outbreak. This messaging strategy depended upon the solid 
working knowledge the Obama White House had of the disease and the responses 
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underway. This working knowledge did not prove as strong an asset when it came to Zika 
two years later.  
RQ4: Did President Barack Obama alter his message regarding Zika in response to 
criticism received on his Ebola communication? 
 The challenge for any President in a time of crisis is to take both criticism and 
experience into account and then arrive at an adequate, often innovative response. As the 
Obama White House’s communication responses to both Ebola and Zika are examined, it 
is expected that messaging may be altered regarding the latter with the former square in 
hindsight. In this case, hindsight exists in the form of public criticisms pushed forward by 
the media.  
During an episode of NPR’s All Things Considered, host Kelly McEvers (2016) 
spoke with former White House Ebola Czar Ronald Klain about the United States’ 
response to the Zika virus in light of its experiences with Ebola. At the start of the 
interview, Klain (2016) read aloud from an op-ed he wrote:  
  It is not a question of whether babies will be born in the United States with  
Zika-related microcephaly. It is a question of when and how many. For 
years to come, these children will be a visible human reminder of the cost 
of the absurd wrangling in Washington, of preventable suffering and of a 
failure of our political system to respond to the threat that infectious 
diseases pose (McEvers, 2016). 
Klain’s criticism of Congress and its failure to act swiftly or adequately in response to 
Zika conveys that no lessons regarding disease response were learned following the 
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Ebola outbreak. President Barack Obama appeared late summer 2016 to share the same 
sentiment.  
On September 20, 2016, President Barack Obama addressed the 71st Session of 
the United Nations General Assembly and spoke of his own perspective gained between 
the Ebola and Zika threats:  
We can’t combat a disease like Zika that recognizes no borders—
mosquitoes don’t respect walls—unless we make permanent the same 
urgency that we brought to bear against Ebola -- by strengthening our own 
systems of public health, by investing in cures and rolling back the root 
causes of disease, and helping poorer countries develop a public health 
infrastructure” (The Obama White House, 2016a, para. 50).  
This statement from the President suggests that there were broad lessons to be learned 
from Ebola—from messaging, to logistics, to the creation of systems of protection. The 
President’s assertions about the need for a strategy in combatting infectious disease as 
well as his own admission of a need to strengthen public health structures within United 
States borders also appear as a response to general media criticisms on a lack of 
preparedness.  
 Arguing for increased preparedness overall, a stronger response to Zika and more 
funding from the United States government, Gottlieb (2016, para. 2) wrote of the lessons 
seemingly unlearned from Ebola:  
The fear of a world-wide explosion in Zika infections carried by Olympic 
attendees who return from Brazil with the virus has all the makings of a 
Hollywood disaster movie. The 2014 Ebola pandemic stemming from an 
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outbreak in West Africa showed how unprepared the world was for 
biological threats. The swift spread of the Zika virus...underscores how 
exposed we remain.  
Though Gottlieb’s words played to some of the more dramatic notions and scenarios 
regarding infectious diseases, they did present a valid argument that the United States 
was vulnerable to health threats, both prior to Ebola and despite the Zika crisis. Gottlieb’s 
article is an example of the kind of media criticism (alongside perspectives such as those 
of Klain) the Obama White House faced as it struggled both to understand and respond to 
the growing Zika problem.  
 Ultimately, the Obama White House’s messaging on Zika did, over time, reflect 
the considerations of its criticisms related to Ebola. In November 2016, Amy Pope 
(Deputy Assistant to President Obama for Homeland Security) and Heather Anne 
Higginbottom (Obama Administration Deputy Secretary of State for Management and 
Resources) released a message on the power of partnerships, where collaborations with 
faith organizations were highlighted as successful across many challenges—including 
Zika (Pope and Higginbottom, 2016). President Barack Obama referenced the 
government’s success in combatting Zika during several addresses. These speeches were 
made to both organizations (such as the United Nations) and to the public and noted that 
the experience of fighting Ebola offered even great learning opportunities. The messaging 
throughout the second half of 2016 on the topic of Zika reflected a wisdom gained from 
both the Ebola experience and criticisms that occurred both during that period and the 




 There is a common understanding in the health and science communities that 
there is no question of if we will encounter a next deadly infectious disease pandemic, but 
when. Leaders in policy, health care, research and government must be prepared to meet 
these threats head-on, and must understand historical wins and losses in order to do so. 
Carlin (2013) began his podcast series The American Peril by mentioning a statement 
shared by Rahm Emmanuel—Chicago Mayor and former Chief of Staff to President 
Barack Obama: “Never let a good crisis go to waste.” Carlin (2013) went on to explain 
why Emmanuel was expectedly—in Carlin’s words—crucified by some media for the 
statement, and to base the rest of The American Peril on the ways that crises present 
leaders with unique opportunities not only to solve a problem at hand, but also prepare to 
solve those of the future.  
Ebola and Zika are both major crises that the Obama White House was forced to 
contend and learn from. This thesis has sought to identify the communication strategies 
used by the White House in response to the Ebola and Zika epidemics through a 
qualitative content analysis of communication artifacts generated between 2014 and 
2016. The thesis also sought to determine how lessons learned during the first crisis 
(Ebola) may generate relevant findings and questions useful for communication 
practitioners and leaders who will inevitably find themselves faced with similar tests in 
the future.  
Sustained response and preparedness are important goals for the future. Gottlieb 
(2016, para. 12) noted the failure to produce a sustained response or to implement a solid 
system of preparedness in his criticism of Zika response against the Ebola experience:  
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The Gates Foundation’s effort to stamp out malaria, and even the WHO’s 
successful role in eradicating smallpox, show that a galvanized world can 
make dramatic gains in fighting diseases. But such fortitude is the 
exception. Instead, the lesson of SARS, avian flu, swine flu and Ebola is 
that political resolve and funding flourish after a threat has exploded—and 
shrivel once the immediate danger abates.  
Gottlieb’s notion of fortitude applies across all aspects of health crisis response—
especially communication. It is the job of communicators to ensure that all stakeholders 
in a crisis are aware of how they are and may be affected and how they must respond to 
protect themselves, their families and their communities. For example, if millions of 
dollars are funneled into vaccine development, but the public does not know how 
important that vaccine is—then those millions are potentially wasted in the very 
“flourish” of which Gottlieb warns us If there is no successful vaccine developed in 
response to a threatening infectious disease, it is imperative that the public understand 
infection control measures, symptoms and where to find help. When a disease threatens 
the United States, these responsibilities fall on the White House and its communication 
team in collaboration with advisors and health agencies such as the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC). Inter-agency collaboration is something that this research 
shows the Obama White House did well.  
 Early on in both the Ebola and Zika crises, the White House was quick to 
reference collaboration with the CDC and other agencies, and also to include their 
leadership and direct recommendations in statements, briefings, videos and online 
material. Two excellent examples of this were the May 2016 video featuring CDC 
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Director Dr. Tom Frieden and NIAID Director Dr. Anthony Fauci and the dedicated 
home pages created for both Ebola and Zika in collaboration with outside agencies and 
housed on the White House site. In the video—“We have a narrow window of 
opportunity” Tom Frieden & Anthony Fauci on Zika—two leaders of U.S. public health 
agencies stood together on the grounds of the White House and noted that they had just 
met with President Obama and reinforced his messages of the need for action (The 
Obama White House, 2016c).  On the pages titled “The Administration’s Response to 
Ebola” (2017) and “The Zika Virus: What You Need to Know,” (Pope, 2016) the Obama 
White House laid out a comprehensive guide for the public that encompassed details 
about each disease, its response and links to resources from the CDC and other The 
Administration’s Response to Ebola s. These strategies of giving other agencies (such as 
the CDC and the NIAID) a face and of encouraging access to their resources by the 
American public humanized solutions and the work being done to combat the threat 
posed by each disease.  
Study Limitations 
My personal interest and background in health communication may be seen as 
both a strength and a bias of this research. Because of my familiarity with health 
terminology and with domestic and global health agencies in general, I approached this 
research with insights into public health communication and a working knowledge of 
some medical terminology that a researcher from another field entirely may have lacked. 
While this is a strength at first glance, the question arises whether one less familiar with 
these areas might gain additional insights or develop fresh research questions during the 
familiarization process.  
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Additionally, because of the subjective nature of qualitative analysis, this study 
has certain innate limitations. Though every effort was made to examine examples of 
every type of artifact relevant to this study’s research questions—including videos, press 
releases, audio statements, media coverage, web pages, and print information—not every 
type was represented equally. As a qualitative content analysis, this research does not 
reflect the results or perceptions of specific communication strategies deployed by the 
White House or utilized directly by President Barack Obama. Throughout the thesis 
process, these questions arose and are certainly valid questions to explore in the future, or 
for the reader to explore independently.  
Implications for Future Research   
 As noted above in my comments on the limitations of this research, many 
questions arose during the development of this paper regarding perception of 
communication strategies by the public. Future research via focus groups may be 
particularly revealing of those perceptions, and may yield significant insights into the 
success of the Obama White House’s Ebola and Zika communication strategies. A focus 
group research project aimed at determining whether video, spoken, or written 
communication were most effective in empowering the public to action may be of great 
interest looking forward. For example, the White House’s reliance on video raises an 
important question for future consideration: Is video the best way to reach the American 
people during a crisis? While videos may be shared by media outlets across the nation 
and globe, it is not a guarantee that the majority of any given audience has access to that 
video.  
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While streamlined communication such as video is important to the public during 
a crisis because it is both informative and ideally offers clear suggestions for how 
Americans might protect themselves from or cope with the dangers posed by any public 
health threat, leaders must weigh those rewards with the risk of appearing not to 
adequately address a crisis. Media criticisms likely contribute to both public perceptions 
and internal criticisms within an administration or organization, so communication 
practitioners must be careful to anticipate these criticisms through strong strategies and 
messaging.  
From the review of literature to the results, this thesis revealed a gap in existing 
academic response to the handling of the Ebola and Zika crises from the communication 
field. Researchers from fields such as public health, political science, economics, 
infectious disease, and sociology have made attempts to assess the lessons of these two 
epidemics and address preparedness for the future. As Tam, Khan and Legido-Quigley 
(2016) found based on their research on migrant workers and infectious diseases, “Better 
intersectoral coordination can ensure that evidence-based recommendations are adhered 
to in a manner that protects the public health and respects the rights and cultural 
sensitivities of this vulnerable population” (p. 1375). The authors make an important 
social and economic point here: that often the people worst affected by epidemics are 
those with reduced access to care and information. This type of challenge is one of many 
presented by epidemics that are new to the United States if not to the developing world.  
Zika showed us that managing an epidemic’s effect on a large event (the Summer 
Olympics in Rio in 2016) further complicates messaging strategy and overall logistics. 
Zumla et al. (2016) stated that “Mass gathering events are theoretically ideal situations 
 55 
for the spread of infections between people from very different and widespread 
geographical localities, with potentially different immune responses” (p. 1). The authors’ 
research, however, recommended that the Summer 2016 Olympics not be canceled on the 
basis of successful handling of this kind of event in the past. These two perspectives are 
evidence of the strength in interdisciplinary research in preparing for the next infectious 
disease threat to the United States. The need for this collaborative research and work is 
just as profound where politics and policy enter the picture.  
In a comparison of how the International Health Regulations were applied in the 
situations of H1N1 and Ebola, Ottersen, Hoffman and Groux (2016) identified “many 
political barriers to global collective action and implementation of lessons” (p. 357). 
Ottersen et al.’s perspective is commentary from a legal and scientific standpoint, but 
touches on the very core of what this thesis sought to explore with communication theory 
and practice in mind. Dolgin (2016) examined the challenges that partisan politics 
presented during the Obama Administration’s response to the Zika virus in the wake of 
Ebola, and found that while “the congressional response to Ebola reflected a coalescence 
of concern that displaced partisan politics,” the response to Zika later on “reflected broad 
ideological disagreements and a delay that could have proved, and may still prove, 
harmful to the health of the population” (p. 1-2). Dolgin’s work expands on Ottersen’s 
statement to political barriers, and highlights a need for a bridge between these and other 
fields as we collectively prepare for the next health crisis.  
Concluding Thoughts  
This thesis suggests that the bridge necessary as multiple disciplines prepare for 
future epidemics is communication. The foundations of public health infrastructure, inter-
 56 
agency logistics and the relationship between the public and government are connected 
through effective communication strategies. These strategies are most important during a 
time of crisis. As Ebola and Zika have taught us, the United States government has a 
great deal of room for improvement in the development and execution of messaging in 
response to infectious disease threats. It is imperative that leaders in U.S. politics, health 
and communication studies work to understand the strategies necessary to successfully 
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RQ1: How has President Barack Obama framed the Ebola virus threat domestically 
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RQ2: How has President Barack Obama framed the Zika virus threat domestically 
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RQ3: How has messaging from President Barack Obama and the White House 
regarding Zika compared to that on Ebola?  
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 Obama and the White House regarding Zika compare to those on Ebola?  
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